Written by Jackson Ikenberry

Introduction

On April 2, 2025, President Trump announced the “Liberation Day” tariffs.¹Barath Harithas et al., “Liberation Day” Tariffs Explained, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud. (Apr. 3, 2025), https://www.csis.org/analysis/liberation-day-tariffs-explained (on file with American University International Law Review). Under this tariff regime, Trump proposed a 10% tariff on all imports into the United States, with additional tariffs imposed on a country-specific basis.²Id. (targeting 57 countries, with rates reaching as high as 50%). This trade policy, invoked under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (“IEEPA”), grants the President broad authority to set economic policy following a state of national emergency.³Christopher A. Casey et al., The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use, Congress.Gov (Sep. 1, 2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R45618/R45618.17.pdf, at 2 (on file with American University International Law Review). Trump cited the large trade deficits between the U.S. and its partners to justify these tariffs, arguing these inequalities threatened national security.⁴See The White House, Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Declares National Emergency to Increase our Competitive Edge, Protect our Sovereignty, and Strengthen our National and Economic Security (Apr. 2, 2025) [hereinafter Fact Sheet], https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/04/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-declares-national-emergency-to-increase-our-competitive-edge-protect-our-sovereignty-and-strengthen-our-national-and-economic-security (on file with American University International Law Review) (declaring that persistent trade deficits have undermined domestic manufacturing capacity, rendering the U.S. defense-industrial base dependent on foreign adversaries constituting a threat to U.S. economic and national security).

As a member of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), the U.S. is bound to follow WTO rules on tariffs codified in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).⁵General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. The WTO enforces GATT through formal panel rulings assessing whether member countries’ tariffs comply with international agreements.⁶Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes World Trade Org. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited June 27, 2026) (on file with American University International Law Review). Although the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the tariffs this past February, before the WTO could issue a formal ruling, their consistency with GATT remains an open question.⁷See generally Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. 229 (2026); see also Adam Feldman, A breakdown of the court’s tariff decision, SCOTUSblog (Feb. 20, 2026), https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/02/a-breakdown-of-the-courts-tariff-decision  (on file with American University International Law Review) (holding that the IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs).

The WTO and GATT: A Brief Overview

GATT was created in 1947 to assist with post-war economic development and facilitate free trade between member states through cooperation and adherence to agreed-upon norms.⁸The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh, World Trade Org. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited June 7, 2026) (on file with American University International Law Review). In January 1995, the WTO incorporated GATT and transformed it from a provisional treaty into a binding agreement enforced by a permanent international legal organization.⁹Id.

Equal treatment is a core principle of the WTO trading system. This principle is reflected in the most-favored-nation principle (MFN), which promotes freer trade through negotiation and predictability through binding trade commitments.¹⁰Principles of the trading system, World Trade Org. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2026) (on file with American University International Law Review). Codified under GATT, Article I establishes the MFN principle and prohibits members from discriminating against one another by enacting excessive tariffs or granting special favor.¹¹GATT, supra note 5, art. I. Article II promotes predictable trade relations by requiring members to impose tariffs according to their agreed-upon bound rates.¹²Id. art. II.

Notably, GATT includes an exception to Article I and II’s equal treatment principle in Article XXI, also known as the security exception.¹³Id. art. XXI. Under Article XXI(b), in times of national emergency, members may “take action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests.”¹⁴Id. art. XXI(b)(i–iii). Although the Liberation Day tariffs invoke the language of Article XXI, claiming trade imbalances constitute an “unusual and extraordinary threat”¹⁵Exec. Order 14257, 90 Fed. Reg. 15041 (Apr. 2, 2025). to U.S. national security, these tariffs are inconsistent with GATT’s equal treatment principle and fall short of the security exception requirement.

Legal Analysis

Article I holds that tariffs should be applied equally to trading partners.¹⁶GATT, supra note 5, art. I. Although the Liberation Day tariffs imposed a universal 10% tariff on all imports, they were amended to include country-specific additions.¹⁷The White House, Further Modifying the Reciprocal Tariff Rates (July 31, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/07/further-modifying-the-reciprocal-tariff-rates (on file with American University International Law Review). For example, China and the European Union faced significant additions, while others like the U.K. and Australia generally received much lower rates.¹⁸William F. Burkhart & Keigh E. Hammond, Presidential 2025 Tariff Actions: Timeline and Status, Congress.GOV (Jan. 12, 2026), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48549 (on file with American University International Law Review). These unequal tariff rates show preferential treatment toward some partners and disfavored treatment toward others, violating the equal treatment principle.¹⁹GATT, supra note 5, art. I. The tariffs also violate Article II, exceeding the U.S.’s bound tariff commitments.²⁰d., supra note 5, art. II; see also Siddhesh Kaushik, Picture Trade: Types of Tariffs Explained, World Bank Blogs (Jan. 11, 2016), https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/trade/picture-trade-types-tariffs-explained (on file with American University International Law Review) (explaining that bound tariff rates are commitments by member states to not increase their customs duties above a certain level). Since joining the WTO, the U.S. has generally maintained tariff rates around 3%.²¹United States of America, WTO Tariff & Trade Data, World Trade Org. https://ttd.wto.org/en/profiles/united-states-of-america (last visited June 13, 2026) (on file with American University International Law Review). As a result, the sudden increase to 10% significantly exceeds the U.S.’s commitments.²²Fact Sheet, supra note 4.

These violations would be excused if they satisfied the essential security exception, which exempts adherence in times of “war or other emergency of international relations.”²³GATT, supra note 5, art. XXI(b)(iii). Although Trump stated that trading partners have taken advantage of the U.S.’s low tariff rates, undermining the U.S.’s “ability to produce essential goods for the public and the military, threatening national security,” the U.S. was not facing an immediate threat to its sovereignty at the time the tariffs were invoked.²⁴Fact Sheet, supra note 4. Consequently, the Liberation Day tariffs are more likely a protectionist effort aimed at correcting trade deficits rather than a good-faith response to an extraordinary national security risk.²⁵See Sarah Akpofure et al., The Use and Abuse of the National Security Exception under Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994, (WTI., Working Paper No. 03/2020, Sep. 15, 2020), https://www.wti.org/research/publications/1299/the-use-and-abuse-of-the-national-security-exception-under-article-xxibiii-of-the-gatt-1994 (on file with American University International Law Review) (arguing that “the proliferation of the use of WTO national security exceptions since 2016 raises concerns that these exceptions are being abused”).

Broader Implications of the Liberation Day Tariffs

The Liberation Day tariffs reflect the U.S.’s willingness to challenge the WTO’s rule-based multilateral framework.²⁶See Petros C. Mavroidis, Tariffs, Deals and Multilateral Ideals: Can the World Trade Organization Survive?, (Bruegel, Working Paper No. 25/2025, Oct. 27, 2025), https://www.bruegel.org/sites/default/files/2025-10/WP%2025.pdf (on file with American University International Law Review) (observing that current U.S. trade policy, including the blocking of judicial appointments to the WTO Appellate Body and the imposition of the Liberation Day tariffs, disregards the WTO’s foundational principles of non-discrimination and tariff bindings, undermining the WTO’s authority). In a 2018 statement regarding retaliatory duties imposed on WTO members, U.S. Ambassador Robert Lighthizer argued that, when interpreting Article XXI, the U.S. has maintained that “member states must determine what is essential to their security.”²⁷Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement by Ambassador Robert E. Lighthizer on Retaliatory Duties (June 26, 2018), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/june/statement-ambassador-robert-e. (on file with American University International Law Review.

Although the Liberation Day tariffs were struck down by the Supreme Court, the United States Trade Representative has since proposed a similar 10% tariff on sixty trading partners under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.²⁸Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods (June 2, 2026), https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/june/ustr-makes-findings-and-proposes-action-60-section-301-investigations-relating-failures-take-action (on file with American University International Law Review).  Further challenging the WTO’s authority, the U.S. has blocked the appointment of new judges to the WTO Appellate Body, putting the dispute settlement process in a deadlock.²⁹Michael D. Goldhaber, Dispute resolution: US efforts remove quorum of WTO’s Appellate Body, Int’l Bar Ass’n, https://www.ibanet.org/article/768437FB-31E1-4FBF-B6CF-1AA08A70550D (last visited June 14, 2026) (on file with American University International Law Review). With the WTO unable to enforce its own rules, members have called for WTO reform, enacted their own retaliatory tariffs, and increasingly looked to other organizations such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to resolve trade disputes and provide a forum for negotiation.³⁰rata Kuno, CPTPP–EU Cooperation Can Set The Pace For Global Trade, East Asia Forum (May 16, 2026), https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/05/16/cptpp-eu-cooperation-can-set-the-pace-for-global-trade (on file with American University International Law Review).

Conclusion

The Liberation Day tariffs are inconsistent with GATT’s equal treatment principle and fall short of the security exception requirement. Thus, they reflect the U.S.’s increasingly expansive interpretation of national security and its willingness to challenge WTO principles.