Written by Sophia Reinoso 

Introduction

While online financial scams impact societies worldwide, few people know that the perpetrators themselves are often victims of scams.¹U.N. Secretariat for the Working Group on Trafficking in Persons, Physical, Digital and Other Types of Evidence in Trafficking in Persons Cases, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc CTOC/COP/WG.4/2025/3 (July 28, 2025). The Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) that operate online financial scams frequently do so through forced labor, recruiting victims on job-seeking websites through fraudulent posts for white-collar jobs.²See, e.g., U.N. Secretariat for the Working Group on Trafficking in Persons, Successful Strategies for Addressing the use of Technology to Facilitate Trafficking in Persons and to Prevent and Investigate Trafficking in Persons, ¶¶ 13–14, U.N. Doc CTOC/COP/WG.4/2021/2 (July 23, 2021). Once victims relocate for their new job, their passports are seized and they are transported to the TCOs’ scam operation compounds, often dubbed “fraud factories.”³See, e.g., Burke Preputnik et al., Cyber Scamming Goes Global: Sourcing Forced Labor for Fraud Factories, CSIS (Dec. 12, 2024), https://www.csis.org/analysis/cyber-scamming-goes-global-sourcing-forced-labor-fraud-factories (last visited Nov. 16, 2025) (on file with the American University International Law Review). While fraud factories first popped up in Southeast Asia, more locations have emerged, including in Mexico, Peru, Ghana, and the United Arab Emirates.⁴ See id.; see also Press Release, Off. of High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Hundreds of Thousands Trafficked to Work as Online Scammers in SE Asia, says UN report, U.N. Press Release (Aug. 29, 2023), https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/08/hundreds-thousands-trafficked-work-online-scammers-se-asia-says-un-report (on file with the American University International Law Review). The trafficked laborers immigrate from across the globe, particularly from countries with high unemployment rates and few job opportunities for educated workers.⁵See Burke Preputnik et al., supra note 3. However, INTERPOL has found that the trafficked laborers also originated from wealthy nations, including the United States, France and the United Kingdom.⁶See INTERPOL Issues Global Warning on Human Trafficking-Fueled Fraud, INTERPOL (June 7, 2023), https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2023/INTERPOL-issues-global-warning-on-human-trafficking-fueled-fraud (last visited Jan. 18, 2026) (on file with the American University International Law Review) (highlighting human trafficking victims by countries of origin on a map).   

The United States is largely unable to act against online human trafficking recruitment efforts for fraud factories due to the current application of Section 230 of the U.S. Code.⁷ See generally, Valerie C. Brannon & Eric N. Holmes, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R46751, Section 230: An Overview, 1, 1–2 (2024) https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R46751 (on file with the American University International Law Review). Section 230 gives deference to technology companies with online platforms.⁸42 U.S.C. § 230. The statute prioritizes few government regulations and largely does not hold online platforms accountable for third party activity.⁹ Id. However, the U.S. has international obligations to combat human trafficking recruitment as a party to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and its annexed United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN Protocol).¹⁰See generally, G.A. Res. 55/25 (XXXI), annex, United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter UNTOC]; G.A. Res. 55/25 (IX), annex, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter UN Protocol]. The U.S. is falling short of its obligations under UNTOC and the UN Protocol because it lacks website regulations that would deter and crack down on fraudulent online job posts that are recruitment schemes for forced labor in fraud factories.¹¹See infra Part III.   

International Human Trafficking Laws Implemented Through Website Regulations 

UNTOC established comprehensive international cooperation to combat organized crime when it was adopted in November 2000 and entered into force on September 29, 2003.¹²Andreas Scholoenhardt, Introduction, in UN Convention Against Transnational Crime: A Commentary 3, 14 (Andreas Scholoenhardt et al. eds., 2023).  The U.S., EU, and Australia are signatories and parties to both UNTOC and the UN Protocol.¹³See generally, UNTOC, supra note 9; UN Protocol, supra note 9.  UNTOC Article 12 addresses States Parties’ obligation to seize property, equipment, and instrumentalities used in the commission of organized crimes targeted by UNTOC, which includes human trafficking recruitment efforts under the UN Protocol.¹⁴UNTOC, supra note 9, art. 12; UN Protocol, supra note 9, art. 3.   

The EU implements comprehensive website regulations through the Digital Services Act (“DSA”), whose 2022 amendment entered into force on February 17, 2024.¹⁵ See Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and Amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), art. 93, 2022 O.J. (L 277) 1, 102 [hereinafter DSA]. The DSA requires EU Member States to have trusted flaggers, which are independent entities that identify and issue notices of illegal content on online platforms, and publish comprehensive reports at a minimum annually.¹⁶See DSA, supra note 14, art. 22; How to Protect Fundamental Rights When Appointing Trusted Flaggers, EDRi, at 2–3, https://edri.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Trusted-Flaggers-guide-for-designation.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2025) (on file with the American University International Law Review).  Further, the DSA includes provisions that require Very Large Online Platforms–– such as LinkedIn ––to act based on trusted flaggers’ notifications, including removing content, or face a monetary penalty.¹⁷ee Supervision of the Designated Very Large Online Platforms and Search Engines Under DSA, Eur. Comm’n: Digit. Strategy, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses (Dec. 5, 2025) (last visited Jan. 18, 2026) (on file with the American University International Law Review); DSA, supra note 14, arts. 9–10, 22, 33, 73.   

The Online Safety Act 2021 is Australia’s principal legislation for website regulations.¹⁸ Online Safety Act 2021 (Cth) pts 1, 3–4, 10 (Austl.) [hereinafter Online Safety Act].  Under the Online Safety Act, end-users of online services and platforms may file complaints of violations of industry codes and standards, including content linked to criminal activity, directly with online service providers.¹⁹ Online Safety Act, supra note 17, §§ 36–40.  If the providers do not respond or refuse to act on the complaints, the end-users may bring the complaint to the eSafety Commissioner.²⁰Online Safety Act, supra note 17, § 36.  Then, the eSafety Commissioner may issue a removal notice to the online platform, which can face a penalty for noncompliance.²¹Online Safety Act, supra note 17, §§ 50, 57, 88.

Section 230’s Regulations Likely Fall Short of International Obligations 

Fraudulent online job posts are TCOs’ property and methods used to recruit victims to provide forced labor in fraud factories.²²See UNTOC, supra note 9, art. 12(1); Enrico M. Mancuso, Confiscation and Seizure, in UN Convention Against Transnational Crime: A Commentary 119, 123 (Andreas Scholoenhardt et al. eds., 2023) (stating that the range of assets that define property, equipment, and instrumentalities used in UNTOC crimes is “extremely broad”).  Therefore, UNTOC Article 12 requires the U.S. and all States Parties to enable the confiscation and removal of job posts on job-seeking websites used to recruit forced laborers for fraud factories.²³See UNTOC, supra note 9, art. 12(1)–(2); Mancuso, supra note 21, at 125.  UNTOC clarifies that parties must adopt the most effective measures that comply with their domestic laws.²⁴UNTOC, supra note 9, art. 12(1)-(2) (“States Parties shall adopt, to the greatest extent possible within their legal system, such measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation of […]”).  Section 230 does not create obligations or mechanisms for the confiscation of property, equipment, or other means involved in online recruitment for fraud factories.²⁵See generally, Brannon & Holmes, supra note 7; 42 U.S.C. § 230.  Further, Section 230 does not incorporate provisions to monitor activity on online platforms, even criminal activity.²⁶See 42 U.S.C. § 230.  

In contrast, the DSA and Online Safety Act create mechanisms to identify, trace, and report fraudulent job posts, whether by trusted flaggers or individual users.²⁷See DSA, supra note 14, art. 22; Online Safety Act, supra note 17, §§ 36–40.  While job-seeking websites have the initial choice of not removing the reported job posts, they also may choose to seize and remove the posts based on the reports.²⁸See DSA, supra note 14, art. 22; Online Safety Act, supra note 17, §§ 36–40.  Ensuring that websites have the initial choice to remove a job post aligns with Section 230’s goal of maintaining technology companies’ and websites’ autonomy.²⁹See 42 U.S.C. § 230 (connecting technological advancements and efficiencies with technology companies’ autonomy).  Therefore, measures that identify, trace, and enable the removal of online content such as fraudulent job posts used in human trafficking recruitment likely do not violate Section 230 or other U.S. laws.³⁰See UNTOC, supra note 9, art. 12(1)–(2); 42 U.S.C. § 230.  If the measures do not violate Section 230, likely the U.S. must implement them to meet its Article 12 obligations.³¹See UNTOC, supra note 9, art. 12.  The measures’ inclusion in the DSA and Online Safety Act, but not in Section 230, indicates that the U.S. does not comply with Article 12, nor its obligations under UNTOC and the UN Protocol more broadly.³²See DSA, supra note 14, art. 22; Online Safety Act, supra note 17, §§ 36–40; 42 U.S.C. § 230; UNTOC, supra note 9, art. 12(1)–(2).  

Recommendations 

The U.S. should amend Section 230 or create a new law to establish trusted flaggers for illegal content and activity on websites.³³ UNTOC, supra note 9, art. 12(1)–(2); How to Protect Fundamental Rights When Appointing Trusted Flaggers, supra note 15, at 4–5.  The law itself would not require websites to take specific actions based on trusted flaggers’ reports, so websites would retain their autonomy.³⁴ See supra Part III.  Further, the U.S. should amend Section 230 to establish mandatory mechanisms for websites to remove confirmed content linked to human trafficking and forced labor, including recruitment for labor in fraud factories.³⁵UNTOC, supra note 9, art. 12(1)–(2); Online Safety Act, supra note 17, §§ 88, 156–59.  While the amendment would compel website action, it would expand on the 2018 amendment of Section 230 which allowed a website to be held accountable for certain sex trafficking criminal activity on the platform.³⁶ See Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018) (amending Section 230); 42 U.S.C. § 230.  

Conclusion

Although UNTOC and the UN Protocol were enacted prior to the social media and internet boom, their obligations apply in the digital space. The U.S. through Section 230 falls short of its obligations under UNTOC and the UN Protocol to combat and prevent recruitment for forced labor in fraud factories through fraudulent online job posts by lacking website regulations to monitor and remove the job posts.