Written by Ashley Rooney
Introduction
Italy has the largest recorded population of voluntary emigrants in modern history, with 13 million people leaving the country between 1880 and 1915 alone.1See Angelo Scotto, From Emigration to Asylum Detention, Italy Navigates Shifting Migration Tides, Migration Policy Institute (Aug. 24, 2017) https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/emigration-asylum-destination-italy-navigates-shifting-migration-tides. However, in the 1970s, Italy experienced a shift from its status as an emigrant country to an immigrant country when large numbers of people relocated to join the Italian labor force.2See id. Following this boom in immigration, the Italian government enacted its first immigration laws in the 1980s to establish migrants’ rights and enhance the status of foreign workers.3See id. These laws, informally known as the Foschi and Martelli laws,4See Legge [Law] 30 dicembre 1986, n. 943, G.U. Dec. 31, 1986, n. 302 (It.); Legge [Law] 28 febbraio 1990, n. 39, G.U. Mar. 3, 1990, n. 52 (It.). proved ineffective in managing the influx of immigrants entering the country due to limited resources for both processing and removal. To mitigate this structural failure at the turn of the new millennium, the Italian government tightened its immigration laws to limit integration, restrict family reunification, and make illegal immigration a felony.5See Scotto, supra note 1. It also began outsourcing Italian border control to countries like Libya, Tunisia, and Albania.6See The Italy-Albania Agreement on Migration: Pushing Boundaries, Threatening Rights, Amnesty Int’l (Jan. 19, 2024) https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/EUR3075872024ENGLISH.pdf [hereinafter “Italy-Albania Agreement on Migration”]. This blog post will provide an overview of the irregular immigration patterns that led to the signing of the Italy-Albania Protocol7See infra Part II. in 2023 and explain how Italy’s externalization of border control violates United Nations (“U.N.”) agreements to which it is a party.8See infra Part III.
Background
The 2015 European refugee crisis highlighted the Italian government’s mismanagement of irregular immigration and identified a need for reform.9See Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Tensions Run High in Rome’s Suburbs as Italy Struggles with Migration Crisis, The Guardian (July 26, 2015, 11:14 AM) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/26/italy-migrant-crisis-rome-protests-tensions-casale-san-nicola. During the refugee crisis, Italy saw an influx of migrants arrive on its shores from Middle Eastern countries due to conflict and instability in the region.10See The Mediterranean Migration Crisis, Human Rights Watch (June 19, 2015) https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/19/mediterranean-migration-crisis/why-people-flee-what-eu-should-do. The increase in immigration put a strain on the country’s resources and prompted political disputes over the status of refugees.11See Halloway et al, Public Narratives and Attitudes towards Refugees and Other Migrants: Italy Country Profile, ODI Global (Dec. 13, 2021) https://odi.org/en/publications/public-narratives-and-attitudes-towards-refugees-and-other-migrants-italy-country-profile/ (reporting that Italian survey respondents held the most hostile views towards migrants in Europe in 2016). To mitigate the economic damage stemming from irregular immigration patterns, the Italian government began externalizing border control in Libya and Tunisia by holding refugees in detention centers in those countries instead of processing them on its own soil.12See Italy-Albania Agreement on Migration, supra note 6. The Italian government has been criticized for sanctioning war crimes and human rights abuses against refugees sent to detention centers in both countries but has denied any wrongdoing.13See id. Amidst this pushback, however, Italy’s outsourcing of border control has now expanded into Albania.14See End the Italy-Libya Memorandum: A Campaign Against Deaths, Pushbacks and Abuse, European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (June 20, 2025) https://www.ecchr.eu/pressemitteilung/end-the-italy-libya-memorandum-a-campaign-against-deaths-pushbacks-and-abuse/#:~:text=The%20agreement%2C%20renewed%20in%202020%2C%20has%20led,violent%20pushbacks%2C%20and%20systemic%20human%20rights%20violations.&text=%E2%80%9CThe%20MoU%20with%20Libya%20is%20part%20of,search%20and%20rescue%20operations%20and%20migrants%20themselves.%E2%80%9D.
On November 6, 2023, Italy and Albania signed a bilateral agreement to manage border control and asylum processing.15See Protocol Between the Government of the Italian Republic and the Council of Ministers of the Albanian Republic, It.-Alb., Nov. 6, 2023 [hereinafter “Italy-Albania Protocol”]; Legge [Law] n. 14, 21 Feb. 2024 (It.) (ratifying the Italy-Albania Protocol). Under the Italy-Albania Protocol, “safe” male individuals rescued or intercepted in the Mediterranean Sea by Italian vessels are to be transferred to detention centers in the Albanian towns of Shengjin and Gjader to manage immigration flows.16See Italy-Albania Agreement on Migration, supra note 6 (labeling non-vulnerable asylum seekers subjected to accelerated border procedure as “safe” dependent upon their country of origin). Most recently, on March 28, 2025, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni issued a decree calling for “urgent provisions to combat irregular immigration.”17See Decreto Legge [Law Decree], n. 37, 28 March 2025 (It.). This decree focuses specifically on the expansion of Albanian detention facilities and permits the transfer of detainees to different centers without approval.18See id. The Italian government’s continued externalization of border control in Albania poses a threat to international law by delaying rescue for persons in distress at sea and automatically detaining asylum-seekers under Italian jurisdiction offshore.19See Italy-Albania Agreement on Migration, supra note 6.
Analysis
Article 98(1)(b) of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) requires every State ship flying its flag “to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him.”20See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 98(1)(b), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter “UNCLOS”]. Italy, in ratifying UNCLOS, has a duty to provide rescue to persons in distress at sea without delay.21See Convention on the Law of the Sea, United Nations Treaty Collection https://treaties.un.org/pages/showdetails.aspx?objid=0800000280043ad5 (recording Italy’s ratification of UNCLOS on January 13, 1995). Nevertheless, instead of taking migrants directly to safety on Italian land, rescue vessels have been rerouting migrants hundreds of miles away to Albania to disembark.22See Italy-Albania Agreement on Migration, supra note 6. This detour has added up to three additional days at sea for rescued individuals, prompting international concern over possible human rights violations.23See id. Under UNCLOS Article 98(1)(b), Italy must bring persons in distress at sea to safety with the utmost speed, regardless of its agreement to detain migrants seeking asylum with Albania.24See UNCLOS, art. 98(1)(b).
Furthermore, in 1979, Italy signed the Final Act of the International Conference on Maritime Search and Rescue, which established a plan to regulate maritime traffic and the rescue of persons in distress at sea.25See U.N. International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, Apr. 27, 1979, 1405 U.N.T.S. 97 [hereinafter “U.N. Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue”]. Section 2.1.9 of the treaty annex, to which Italy agreed, states that the “responsible authorities of that Party shall take urgent steps to provide the most appropriate assistance available.”26See id. annex ¶ 2.1.9. Moreover, Section 2.1.10 states that assistance should be provided to any person at sea “regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is found.”27See id. annex ¶ 2.1.10. Both Sections 2.1.9 and 2.1.10 of the U.N. Maritime Search and Rescue Treaty annex have been violated by the Italian government.28See id. annex ¶¶ 2.1.9– 2.1.10. First, the Italian government has failed to take urgent steps to provide reasonable assistance to migrants in distress at sea by receiving them and sending them to Albanian detention centers rather than bringing them to safety on nearby Italian shores.29See Italy-Albania Agreement on Migration, supra note 6. Second, the Italian government has failed to disregard the status of persons in distress at sea by specifically looking to the national origins or refugee status of rescued individuals before rerouting them to Albanian detention camps.30See id. Third, the Italian government has been silent on the procedures used to identify “safe” male individuals being taken to Albania versus Italy.31See id. And fourth, the Italian government is prolonging the detention of people taken to Albania regardless of asylum-seeking status.32See id. In light of this, the Italian and Albanian governments, working in consort, are outwardly violating the freedoms of migrants as protected under ratified international agreements.33See UNCLOS art. 98(b)(1); U.N. Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, annex, ¶¶ 2.1.9–2.1.10.
Conclusion
The Italian government’s externalization of border control in Albania mirrors the country’s criticized involvement in Libya and Tunisia, violating international agreements the country is a party to and threatening the rights of asylum-seekers.34See Italy-Albania Protocol, supra note 15; UNCLOS, supra note 20; U.N. Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, supra note 25. Due to Italy’s status as a member of the U.N., other U.N. member states should take an investigative look into possible human rights abuses sanctioned by the Italian government in Albania and prevent the country from externalizing its border control in the future.35See Official Names of the United Nations Membership, United Nations https://www.un.org/dgacm/sites/www.un.org.dgacm/files/Documents_Protocol/officialnamesofcountries.pdf (last visited June, 29, 2025).