Written by Nathan Yost

Introduction

In March 2011, Ethiopia announced the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a massive hydropower project on the Blue Nile.¹M.A. Salman, The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: The Road to the Declaration of Principles and the Khartoum Document, 41 Water Int’l 512, 515 (2016). Designed with a height of 145 meters and a storage capacity of 74 billion cubic meters, GERD will be Africa’s largest hydroelectric dam²Id. at 515—16. and is central to Ethiopia’s plans for economic growth and energy production.³Yohannes Girma Wedajo, The Stalemate Over the Negotiation Process of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), 11 Mediterr. J. Soc. Sci. 37, 38. However, the project has sparked opposition from Egypt and Sudan.⁴Gary Polakovic, Water Dispute on the Nile River Could Destabilize the Region, USC News (July 13, 2021), https://today.usc.edu/nile-river-water-dispute-filling-dam-egypt-ethiopia-usc-study. Egypt, which relies on the Nile for over 90% of its freshwater needs, fears GERD could reduce its water supply by up to 25% during droughts.⁵Christopher R. Rossi, Water Security and Hydro-Egoism: Endogenous Hegemony and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, 32 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 247, 264 (2022). Sudan initially supported GERD for its potential benefits in water regulation and hydroelectric power but has since raised concerns about its impact on Sudanese dams and water security.⁶Id. at 272—73. This ongoing dispute raises complex questions of international water law, regional stability, and the use of diplomatic negotiation.

Historical and Legal Context

At the heart of the dispute is the issue of international water rights.⁷William G. Krentz, The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: How a Cross-Border Project Violates Treaty Obligations and the Inherent Rights of Neighboring States’ Citizens, 41 Wis. Int’l L.J. 677, 698—99 (2024). Egypt argues that GERD violates the 1929 and 1959 Nile Waters Agreements, which grant Egypt and Sudan control over the Nile and require upstream nations to seek Egypt’s approval for major projects.⁸John Mukum Mbaku, The Controversy Over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Brookings (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam. Ethiopia, which was not a party to these treaties, rejects their validity and asserts that they unfairly exclude upstream nations and fail to reflect equitable resource allocation.⁹Salman, supra note 1, at 512—13.

The 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (“the Convention”) provides a potential legal framework for resolving transboundary water disputes, emphasizing equitable and reasonable utilization.¹⁰Agnes Chong, Restoring the Environmental Protection of International Rivers: A Case for a Textual Approach to Interpreting Global Water Treaties, 42 B.U. Int’l L.J. 27, 28—30 (2024). It also imposes obligations on states, including the duty to prevent significant harm and the requirement of prior notification for planned projects.¹¹Id. However, its impact is limited in the Nile Basin as neither Egypt nor Ethiopia has ratified the treaty.¹²Rossi, supra note 5, at 269—70. Ethiopia, in particular, is wary that the principle of equitable use could be interpreted in a manner that curtails its control over essential water resources.¹³Andualem Eshetu Lema, The United Nations Watercourses Convention from The Ethiopian Context: Better To Join or Stay Out?, 4 Haramaya L. Rev. 1, 27—31). Egypt, meanwhile, has resisted full adoption, for fear that the Convention’s principles could undermine its longstanding claims under the 1929 and 1959 treaties.¹⁴Mbaku, supra note 8. If both countries were to recognize the Convention, it could provide a structured framework for dispute resolution through mechanisms such as negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.¹⁵Zienab Ali Abdelhady, The Influence of the UN Watercourses Convention on the Development of a Policy Design in the Nile River Basin, at 90 (2025) (Master’s thesis, Am. Univ. in Cairo), https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/2466.

Potential Pathways for Resolution

Diplomatic efforts under the African Union have sought to mediate a compromise, but talks have repeatedly stalled.¹⁶Wedajo, supra note 3, at 40—41. Egypt demands legally binding guarantees on water flow levels, while Ethiopia insists on retaining full control over the dam’s operations.¹⁷Id. A basin-wide agreement would offer a long-term solution but would also require substantial diplomatic efforts.¹⁸Id. at 47—48. Such an agreement needs to balance upstream development with downstream water security, ensuring equitable use while preventing significant harm.¹⁹Id. at 48. Direct negotiations under a neutral regional framework, such as the African Union, could provide a structured platform for dialogue.²⁰Id. at 47—48. The agreement should replace outdated colonial-era treaties with a comprehensive legal framework like the Cooperative Framework Agreement, emphasizing fair water allocation and benefit-sharing.²¹Id. The agreement should also include binding mechanisms for dispute resolution, scientific assessments, and joint water management to foster transparency and compliance, creating a sustainable framework for long-term cooperation.²²See Ana Maria Daza-Clark., Dispute Settlement Mechanisms applicable to International (Transboundary) Water Resources, PeaceRep, at 11—31 (2022), https://peacerep.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Water-Report.pdf (discussing the terms included in other transboundary watercourse agreements).

Conclusion

The GERD conflict highlights the challenges of managing transboundary water resources in an era of increasing climate uncertainty.²³Chong, supra note 10, at 30. It serves as a critical test for international water law, highlighting key issues surrounding the equitable allocation of water resources, the protection of environmental flows, and the balance between national sovereignty and regional cooperation.²⁴Id. at 57—58. A legal resolution alone is unlikely to be sufficient; diplomatic engagement and a willingness to compromise will be necessary to avoid prolonged tensions or potential conflict.²⁵Mbaku, supra note 8. The best path forward lies in a negotiated settlement that acknowledges all parties’ concerns and establishes a durable framework for cooperation.²⁶Wedajo, supra note 3, at 48.